The Problems of Dagestan

Although Dagestan is once again in the headlines, there remains little understanding of the threat posed by the largest North Caucasus republic. Dagestan shares borders with Georgia and Azerbaijan, and Makhachkala is one of Russia's few year-round ice-free ports, so the republic is of vital importance for Russian national security. Nevertheless, the terrorist attacks are only being examined in the immediate context; the discussion is about the possible culprits and versions of events while the socio-political environment in which the crime took place remains in the background. However, the executors of the crime are products of the internal situation. Dagestan is regularly subject to media interest in conjunction with "political murders", acts of terrorism, sabotage or counter-terrorism, but in contrast with neighboring Chechnya, all these events are recorded without being analyzed. The Russian government at least attempted to interpret the "Chechen crisis" and place it in a certain context, the recent occurrences in Dagestan are not getting any systematic evaluation at all. 

The fact is that the current situation in Dagestan is much murkier and more complicated. The situation in Chechnya in the 1990s was much more clear-cut: The main adversaries of federal power were separatists; their action, motivation, slogans and ideology were thoroughly examined. But neither then, nor today, has Dagestan been infected with separatism. It was the only one of the North Caucasus republics that did not seek sovereignty in the early 1990s. In Dagestan, the Independence and Revival Party did not play any significant role and was soon relegated to the political margins. But then, the republic's almost official slogan is this quote from national poet Rasul Gamzatov: "Dagestan did not become part of Russia voluntarily and will not cease to be part of Russia voluntarily."

There is a lot of talk about the Dagestan's ethnic diversity and the conflicts that result from it. However, the Republic's problems and conflicts cannot be explained by this alone. In the 1990s ethnic discord was the main challenge to Dagestan's unity. It resulted in conflict and acts of violence, including terrorism, but the ethnic elite themselves and the government of the Republic have managed to prevent Dagestan becoming a second Chechnya. Additionally, "blood ties" do not always play a crucial role in Dagestan; loyalty to the republic often means a lot more. Finally there is another important factor that has increased in significance since the mid-1990s--the Islamic revival. 

Those who now adhere to "revitalized Islam" (the local Salafi version that is sometimes referred to incorrectly as Wahhabism), come from different ethnic groups. Salafi Muslims have become popular because they have stuck to slogans advocating social justice and a struggle against corruption. They offer a new alternative to a society disillusioned with the Soviet regime and the democracy of the 1990s. But this does not fully explain the problems in the region.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many people moved from Dagestan to other parts of Russia. Many of them managed to build successful careers, to get good educations, run businesses, earn money and make a living as civil servants, intellectuals and businessmen. Now some of them would like to give something back, to return to Dagestan and use their material and moral capital for its benefit. After years living away from their small homeland, many of them consider their identity as a citizen of Dagestan no less important than their ethnic origins. And yet another "boundary" has arisen - the Russian Dagestanis of various nationalities are at odds with the Republic's multiethnic bureaucracy. These "internal Dagestani emigrants" are working independently on opening up the republic; at the same time, their ambitions clash with every level of Dagestan's governmental elite.

In contrast with Chechnya, it is much more difficult to gauge dissident activity in Dagestan; dissidence is multifaceted. It may take the form of an ethnic or religious protest, or it may be found in business or in government. Therefore, Dagestan requires a much more diversified policy. There are many cases of bombings and acts of violence, but there is an individual story behind every one of these; each has its own reasons and motivations. In one incident, the stimulus might be the "privatisation" of government and personal property by "foreigners." In another, it could be the actions of Islamic extremists. But then these Islamic extremists are not nearly as united as the propagandists would have us believe. They do indeed include people whose motivations are purely religious, but there are also those who are the victims of corruption and a tyrannical government. 

The existence of so many distinct dissident factions with different derivations is only possible when social relationships are not institutionalized, but based on informal principles and personal relationships. Enver Kisriev, the well-known Russian expert on the Caucasus who is himself originally from Dagestan, aptly observes: "A system based on family connections stifled the economics of the whole North Caucasian political system and concentrated the penal system in the hands of a few people. It makes people doomed to destitution and creates a huge number of problems for society. It causes young people to hate their own lives. The young generally have an underdeveloped instinct for self-preservation. Young people can easily take very precarious measures, especially when there is no other way out."

Due to the lack of public procedures and institutional norms, in Dagestan, a republic burdened with conflict on many levels, people resort to violence as a means of solving volatile issues. In this sense the motivation and legitimation of this violence is not the central issue. Dagestan's biggest challenge today is in many ways identical to that of the whole of the North Caucasus--implementing the modernization process where the task of preservation is being replaced by the task of development. It is this strategic task (and not only anti-terrorism measures) that should take priority. Even the most brilliantly executed annihilation of militants cannot offset the fact that Dagestan lacks the mechanisms to allow worthy people from poor families to get a good education and a position in government or business. According to Kisriev, "talented young people do not have the opportunity to develop themselves here and to get a good job, this especially applies to people with a keen sense of their own dignity, which they demand of themselves and others." So it is the frustrated youth who are being recruited as Dagestani jihadists. Consequently, it is essential we stop putting out fires and instead prevent them from ever starting. If this doesn't happen, then any volatile issue is going to be resolved with gunshots or blackmail. And it will be extremely difficult for Dagestan to resolve this problem on its own, without the help of the central government.

Dagestan in the Focus of Global Problems

Dagestan’s Troubles Mount, Mirroring Its Torturous Terrain

Judith Latham January 

The Republic of Dagestan over the past few months has emerged as the least stable place in an increasingly troubled Russian Federation.  “Violence in the region is Russia’s biggest problem,” Russian President Vladimir Putin has recently said.

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Although Russian is Dagestan’s official language, only a tiny minority of its population is ethnic Russian – perhaps five percent – according to Paul Goble, an expert on the peoples of the former Soviet Union.  “There are 30 different indigenous nationalities that speak 30 different languages, almost none of which are mutually intelligible,” Goble said.
  
These ethnic communities, which are based primarily on language, are subdivided by family and clan.  “But unlike in Afghanistan or northwest Pakistan, ‘tribal’ would be the wrong word to describe Dagestan,” Goble said.  Although the Avars have been the predominant nationality in recent years, no group commands a majority, he noted.

Dagestan’s mountainous terrain impedes travel and communication.  “It is one of the most topographically difficult places on earth, where people live in isolated, segmented ways,” Goble explains. 

Economic and Political Barriers

Economically and politically, Dagestan is in shambles.“Dagestan is a place that earns money from the transit of oil and gas, unlike Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan, which earn money from production,” Goble said.  Furthermore, a once lucrative fishing industry that yielded caviar produced from the sturgeon in the Caspian Sea, has been severely restricted. 
  
“Dagestan has clearly become the most unstable place in the Russian Federation, and part of it has to do with extreme poverty,” Goble said.  The large numbers of unemployed young men constitute a source of terrorist violence.  “Furthermore, you have a long tradition of Islamic and ethnic resistance to central power,” Goble explained.

Violence, a Shared Problem

But Russian journalist Masha Lipman of the Carnegie Moscow Center suggests the problems the Kremlin faces in Dagestan are not categorically different from those in other parts of the North Caucasus, particularly in Chechnya and Ingushetia.  “Some of these are the result of a policy of neglect, appointing leaders loyal to Moscow, and then looking the other way,” Lipman said.

“Given the economic problems and the problems of crime and corruption, it’s very difficult to find the right person to appoint as the leader of Dagestan because of its very delicate ethnic balance,” Lipman explained.  “And there is no good solution that can improve the situation in the region in the conceivable future.”

In fact, political turmoil and violence are not unique to the North Caucasus, according to Lipman, because the Kremlin picks the leaders for more than 80 administrative entities within the Russian Federation.  So, their leaders are dependent on the Kremlin.  And Dagestan – like the other republics of the North Caucasus – is economically unviable.  “It is just one example of a territory where acts of violence – often accompanied by fatalities – happen on a daily basis,” Lipman said.  It is a “well known fact” that political leaders cannot control the killing of administrative officials and police, she notes.

Role of Political Islam

Radical Islam, Lipman suggests, plays a significant role in this violence.  “True,” says Goble, but the Kremlin has a tendency to blame Islam for problems in the Russian Federation, even when other factors are clearly at play. ” In Dagestan, he argues, ethnic differences reinforce all the other problems.  “Nonetheless, Islam in Dagestan has historically been the most resistant to the expansion of Russian power.”

However, it is misleading to lump together the causes for violence in Dagestan and in Chechnya, Goble said.  “The problems in Chechnya were an ethno-national movement the Russians tried to suppress, and it developed later into a more religious one.”  In contrast, Dagestan did not have a national liberation front.  “What you had over the past 15 years is a desire to be left alone.”

People tend to forget that the traditional Muslim leadership in the North Caucasus was trained in Bukhara and Tashkent, Goble points out.  “And what is going on in the Fergana Valley in Central Asia is very closely related to what is going on in the North Caucasus,” he adds.